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What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal
Court System?
Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwabt
Two hundred years is a long time. It is too long after forma-
tion of a court system to ask such basic questions as (1) what cases
occupy the system, and (2) whether even informed professionals
have a reasonable picture of what goes on within the system.
Nonetheless, continuing debate about the volume and makeup of
litigation in general and of federal court litigation in particular re-
quires legal scholars to address these questions.1 Professor Marc
Galanter's work on the litigation explosion questions central as-
sumptions about the nature and growth of the federal docket.2 Our
prior work undermines widely held views about constitutional tort
litigation, the effect of the civil rights fee-shifting statute, and pris-
oner constitutional tort litigation.' Yet observers continue to note
the many constitutional tort actions, describing them as "an ever
more powerful tool" for challenging official action4 and noting an
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I See, for example, Harry T. Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the
Profession, 38 J Legal Educ 285 (1988); Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and
Future Trends, 71 Judicature 151 (1987); Henry J. Reske, Was There a Liability Crisis?, 75
ABA J 46 (Jan 1989); Richard B. Schmitt, Survey Questions Liability Crisis At U.S. Com-
panies, Wall St J B7 (Jan 18, 1989).
2Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Md L Rev 3 (1986); Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L Rev
4 (1983).
3 Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litiga-
tion, 72 Cornell L Rev 641 (1987); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining
Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Gov-
ernment as Defendant, 73 Cornell L Rev 719 (1988).
Constitutional tort litigation consists of civil actions brought against state and local
officials under 42 USC § 1983 and civil actions brought against federal officials based on
Bivens v Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 US 388 (1971).
" Linda Greenhouse, 1871 Civil Rights Law Now Used for Many Causes, NY Times B6,
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"explosion" in new uses of section 1983. 5 The section is "swamping
the federal courts" and expediting the financial decay facing many
local governments.6 And respected judges and commentators fer-
vently argue that the caseload is smothering the courts. Judge
Harry Edwards and some of his judicial colleagues have "the feel-
ing that our friends in the law schools [do] not really understand
the problems facing the judiciary .... 8
Plainly, interested observers of the system have radically dif-
ferent views of litigation reality. This article explores why this
might be so. For example, why is it that we cannot identify a civil
rights explosion when judges and others perceive one? 9 How can a
Supreme Court Justice announce a geometric increase in civil
rights litigation after enactment of a fee-shifting statute" at a time
when there was little support for even arithmetic growth?" Why is
it that some observers suspect that constitutional tort litigation is
highly successful 2 when, by most tangible measures, it is one of
the less successful classes of federal litigation?13
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
To explore the puzzling variety of views of the federal court
system, it is helpful to identify different outlooks on that system.
This article provides an empirical perspective on appellate litiga-
tion to supplement an earlier district court study of constitutional
tort litigation. 14 The appellate study allows examination of ques-
tions that are of interest in their own right, but that also aid in
assessing different perceptions of the federal courts. First, what
does constitutional tort litigation look like on appeal and how does
1 Andrew Blum, Lawsuits Put Strain on City Budgets, Natl L J 1 (May 16, 1988).
6 Id.
See, for example, Edwards, 38 J Legal Educ at 286 (cited in note 1); Richard A. Pos-
ner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 63-65 (Harvard, 1985).
Edwards, 38 J Leg Educ at 285 (cited in note 1).
On judicial perception of constitutional tort litigation, see Eisenberg & Schwab, 72
Cornell L Rev at 646-50 (cited in note 3). For continuing discussion of the volume of consti-
tutional tort litigation, see Greenhouse, NY Times at B6 (Aug 26, 1988) (cited in note 4).
10 Pulliam v Allen, 466 US 522, 555-56 (1984) (Powell dissenting).
11 Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 666 (cited in note 3); Schwab & Eisenberg,
73 Cornell L Rev at 756-59 (cited in note 3).
12 Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 651 n 55 (cited in note 3).
13 Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models & Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Pris-
oner Cases, 77 Georgetown L J - (1989) (forthcoming); Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L
Rev at 674 (Table VIII) (cited in note 3); Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 733
(Table IV) (cited in note 3).
14 Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev 641 (cited in note 3); Schwab & Eisenberg, 73
Cornell L Rev 719 (cited in note 3).
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it differ from other appellate litigation? Second, how does it differ
from constitutional tort litigation at the district court level?
Consider three observers of the system. The first obtains infor-
mation about the system from published appellate15 opinions.
Many, even most, nonjudicial observers of the system know only
what they read in published opinions. Most law students, law
professors, and non-litigator lawyers fit into this category."6 They
know little about the detailed breakdown of case filings in district
court and have little direct information about the outcome of liti-
gation at anything other than the appellate level. Moreover, even
at the appellate level, detailed systematic information about cases
resolved without opinion rarely finds its way into public news
channels.
The second observer might be an appellate judge, who sees all
filed appeals and indeed decides which appellate opinions should
be published. The appellate judge, by reviewing district court judg-
ments, has a window on litigation at the trial court level, but the
perspective is likely to differ from that of the district court judge.
The third observer is the district court judge, who sees all filings
and has a ground level view of litigation.
Our central purpose is to see to what extent the perspectives
of these three heroic observers will differ. The observers are not
ordinary, for each has extraordinary vision. The law professor
knows and accurately weighs all published appellate opinions; the
appellate judge considers every filed appeal; and the district court
judge keeps sight of every filing. Will their observations differ? Le-
gal realists and others believe that published opinions are a skewed
subset of filed cases, so finding some differences should not be sur-
prising."" The point is not that one perspective is more correct
than any other. Certainly the district court judge sees the bulk of
litigation, but perhaps loses the forest for the trees. Arguments can
be made, and most law school casebook teaching is based on the
supposition, that published appellate opinions convey the most ac-
curate view of what the law is. Our objective is to assess how these
three heroic observers might view constitutional tort litigation dif-
ferently. Based on this assessment, our study suggests that differ-
16 We did not include district court opinions in this survey. See text at note 34 for an
explanation.
16 The informed lay public probably derives much of their information of the legal sys-
tem through published opinions as well, though derivatively as legal journalists report the
results of cases.
1'7 See, for example, George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984).
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ent sources of information about litigation partly explain the radi-
cally different perceptions of constitutional tort litigation.
Briefly summarized, we find that different stages in federal
court litigation lead to different impressions of the volume and na-
ture of federal litigation. With respect to the number of cases, the
observers whose perceptions of the federal court system are shaped
by reading published appellate opinions or by judging appellate fil-
ings would detect a much higher volume of nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort litigation relative to other forms of litigation than would
the observer of cases filed at the district court level.' 8 A plausible
hypothesis about the overestimation of the volume of district court
constitutional tort litigation is that many observers see or read
about the many published appellate opinions without any system-
atic sense of the characteristics of filed district court cases.
With respect to the outcome of litigation, the reader of pub-
lished appellate opinions would also have a substantially different
impression of constitutional tort litigation than would the observer
of filed cases. We take two distinct approaches. First, we focus on
the actual outcomes in each stage of litigation, comparing the suc-
cess of constitutional tort plaintiffs in district court with their suc-
cess on appeal. Constitutional tort plaintiffs are substantially more
successful at the appellate level than at the district court level.19
Thus to the extent published appellate opinions shape views of the
court system, observers would believe constitutional tort litigation
is more successful than it really is at the trial court level.
Our second approach reinforces the inflated perception of suc-
cess. We examine published opinions not only for what they tell
about the outcome of the appellate process, but also for the story
they tell about what went on below. For many observers the domi-
nant source of information about the outcome of trials is, once
again, published appellate opinions. Ignoring the outcome of the
appeal, what impression of district court constitutional tort litiga-
tion do published appellate opinions create, and how does that im-
pression differ from what our idealized district court observer per-
ceives? Briefly, we find that the cases that lead to published
appellate opinions are, at the district court level, a highly success-
ful subset of all filed cases, with a different distribution of subject
matter and procedural progress.20
After describing the nature of the studies conducted, and their
18 See text at notes 58-62.
19 See text at notes 63-68 and Table III.
20 See text at notes 76-79 and Table IV.
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limitations, we present the results of the appellate study. We then
contrast the appellate results with the district court results. Fi-
nally, we return to the question of what shapes the differing views
of the legal system.
Two limitations should be highlighted. First, study of one area
of federal litigation, constitutional tort cases, can provide only lim-
ited insight into other areas of litigation. Nevertheless, the area is
important even though one must be wary of extrapolating our find-
ings to other areas. If one is going to study the federal court sys-
tem on the occasion of its bicentennial, there could hardly be a
more appropriate class of cases to study than constitutional tort
cases. They, as much as any class of cases, show the federal courts
at work in what has become their central role as guardians of civil
liberty. As this and other studies show, constitutional tort cases
also comprise a substantial portion of the workload of both the
federal courts of appeals and the federal district courts.
Second, the questions of court caseload and case outcome en-
compass many different nuances that we deliberately ignore. The
court system is ever changing. However large the federal district
court docket has grown in the past thirty years,21 that growth is
dwarfed by the growth rate of the appellate docket.22 The Supreme
Court's workload has become an area of study unto itself.23 Also,
the real world observers of the system, whose perceptions we try to
capture, include many different groups-lawyers, district court
judges, courts of appeals judges, academics, and policymakers.
Within these groups there are important differences in the sources
of perceptions. District judges in the Eastern District of Virginia or
the Middle District of Florida, which often are among the leading
districts in prisoner civil rights filings,24 probably have a very dif-
ferent perspective on the federal caseload than does a judge in a
district not fed by prisoner civil rights petitions. Appellate courts
have long been recognized as having different characteristics and
as engaging in different interactions than trial courts.25 And within
21 Posner, The Federal Courts at 62-65 (cited in note 7).
22 Id.
23 See, for example, Samuel Estreicher & John Sexton, Redefining the Supreme Court's
Role (Yale, 1986); Gerhard Casper & Richard A. Posner, The Workload of the Supreme
Court (Am Bar Found, 1976).
14 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1986 Annual Report of the Director 181-88
(Table C 3) (GPO, 1986); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1984 Annual Report of
the Director 265-263 (Table C 3) (GPO, 1984); Administrative Office of the US. Courts,
1983 Annual Report of the Director 248-55 (Table C 3) (GPO, 1983).
21 See Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb, eds, Judicial Conflict and Consensus:
Behavioral Studies of American Appellate Courts (U Kentucky, 1986); J. Woodford How-
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the appellate courts, the judges of the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals write opinions that are twice as long as those issued in other
circuits, containing more than six times the number of footnotes,"
with a unique subject matter workload.27 Regardless of the cause
or justifiability of the longer opinions, these judges' views on the
nature of the workload may differ from those of judges in other
circuits. Thus, even if we successfully identify different sources of
perceptions about constitutional tort cases, directly linking the dif-
ferent perspectives to a specific group's perceptions (as if any of
those groups had a single perception of the system) would be diffi-
cult. We must settle for idealized groupings and simplified catego-
ries. If we begin to make the different perceptions of the sys-
tem-and their causes-part of the serious debate about federal
court litigation we will have accomplished our task.
II. THE DISTRICT AND APPELLATE COURT STUDIES
The results discussed here stem from data gathered in two
studies, one of federal district court filings and one of opinions
published by federal courts of appeals. In addition, we use data on
district court and appellate filings published by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts to help assess the relative bur-
den of constitutional tort litigation on district and appellate
dockets.
A. The District Court Study
The district court study, described in greater detail in earlier
work,2 s includes data on nearly every nonprisoner and prisoner
constitutional tort case filed from October 1, 1980 to September
30, 1981 in three major federal districts. The districts covered are
the Central District of California, which includes Los Angeles, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which includes Philadelphia, and
the Northern District of Georgia, which includes Atlanta. Together
these districts comprised 8.6 percent of the 1980 United States
population,2 and, in 1981, their dockets accounted for 8.1 percent
ard, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System (Princeton, 1981).
26 Posner, Federal Courts at 118 (Table 4.4) (cited in note 7).
27 Howard, Courts of Appeals at 30 (Table 2.4) (cited in note 25).
28 Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev 641 (cited in note 3); Schwab & Eisenberg, 73
Cornell L Rev 719 (cited in note 3).
29 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, using preliminary census data, re-
ported the 1980 population of the three districts as: 11,950,211 (Central District of Califor-
nia), 5,017,194 (Eastern District of Pennsylvania), 2,895,912 (Northern District of Georgia).
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of all federal nonbankruptcy civil filings, 7.9 percent of all non-
prisoner civil rights filings, and 4.2 percent of all prisoner civil
rights filings.30 For comparison the district court study also in-
cludes a randomly selected sample of all non-civil-rights civil fil-
ings in the same districts.
B. The Appellate Court Study
The appellate court study covers published opinions from the
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh federal circuit courts of appeals, the
circuits encompassing the three districts in the district court
study."' It examines opinions published from October 1, 1980 to
December 31, 1985. It thus includes the time period covered by the
district court study but, to assure a sufficiently large sample for
our purposes, covers a longer period of time. Appellate opinions
are not generated as quickly as district court filings. At the appel-
late level, as at the district level, we divided the universe of cases
into constitutional tort cases and a control group of non-civil-
rights cases. We tried to include every constitutional tort case that
resulted in a published opinion during the period, though we doubt
that the results would change significantly if some opinions were
not found. 2 In total, we gathered 771 published constitutional tort
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics During the
Twelve-Month Period Ended December 31, 1981 A-92 (Table X-1O) (Statistical Analysis &
Reports Division, 1982). The combined population figure for the three districts is
19,863,317. The same data show the total U.S. population to be 229,910,565. Other reports
of census data differ slightly from these figures.
30 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1986 Annual Report of the Director 369-
373 (GPO, 1981). These figures are for a twelve month period slightly different than that
used in the field portion of this study. The relatively low percentage of prisoner civil rights
filings represented by the three districts is in part a consequence of the bunching of prisoner
civil rights filings in a few districts. For example, the Eastern District of Virginia and the
Middle District of Florida had, respectively, 8.3 percent and 5.8 percent of all prisoner civil
rights filings for the period.
3' The old Fifth Circuit was divided into a new Fifth Circuit and the current Eleventh
Circuit during this time. The Northern District of Georgia had been part of the old Fifth
Circuit but is now part of the Eleventh Circuit. In an effort to keep some minimal tie to the
district court regions studied, we include Fifth Circuit cases from before the breakup and
Eleventh Circuit cases after the breakup.
32 The Westlaw search used was:
"((42 + S 1983) (1983 & CIVIL + S RIGHT) BIVENS) & DATE(AFTER 9/30/80 &
BEFORE 1/1/86)"
This search provided a list of cases that was vastly overinclusive in that it included many
non-constitutonal-tort cases. They were eliminated. Although there may be some constitu-
tional tort cases missed by the search, it should pick up every Westlaw case citing § 1983 or
mentioning Bivens. Of course, there is no requirement that all "published" opinions show
up in Westlaw. And there are known differences among Administrative Office publication
figures, Westlaw figures, and Lexis figures. See Peter W. Martin, Memorandum to Donna
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appellate opinions. From the non-civil-rights category of published
opinions, we extracted a random sample sufficiently large to assure
statistical representativeness (760 opinions). 3
We recognize the possibility of monitoring district court pub-
lished opinions as well as or instead of appellate level published
opinions. However, there are several drawbacks to using district
court opinions. First, no individual district issues a substantial
number of constitutional tort opinions in a year. Second, district
court judges, even more than appellate judges, may decide to pub-
lish opinions in skewed samples of cases. Professor Franklin's
study of First Amendment litigation suggests that trial judges are
more likely to publish opinions when making decisions that con-
clude cases, such as granting motions to dismiss or granting sum-
mary judgment rather than when denying such motions.34 Third,
in testing impressions about the litigation system, it is more realis-
tic to study appellate opinions. In general, they are likely to be
more widely read than district court opinions and have a greater
precedential value.
C. Limitations of the Studies
Ideally, one would study all district court filings and all court
of appeals opinions to determine whether they project different
pictures of litigation. The comprehensiveness of such data would
assure representativeness. Time and resources restrict the studies
used here to more limited times and places. Although the district
court and published opinion samples are related, the studies can
be thought of as two substantial studies of litigation, conducted
largely independently of one another. We use the district court
study to assess the impression of litigation generated by filings and
the appellate study to assess the impression of litigation generated
Stienstra, Stewart Schwab, Ted Eisenberg and Other Interested Folks, (March 6, 1987) (on
file with the University of Chicago Law Review).
33 We tried to uncover every case for which Westlaw reports a published opinion for the
period covered. We then randomly sampled each circuit and eliminated criminal cases and
civil rights cases from the control group. The net result yielded 956 control group cases, 196
of which were agency cases. We limit the study to civil appeals and thus exclude the agency
cases, leaving a sample of 760 cases. The 760 sampled opinions are drawn from a population
of 4,765 possible control group opinions. See note 42. The sample size is large enough to
assure that a 95 percent confidence interval is within .06 of the sample mean. For an esti-
mate of the completeness of the study see note 43. We also exclude from the control group
civil rights and prisoner cases that are not constitutional tort cases.
31 Marc A. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 Am Bar Found
Res J 797, 799 n 11; Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defama-
tion Litigation, 1980 Am Bar Found Res J 455, 464.
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by published opinions.
Because the data used are not comprehensive, the figures de-
rived from them may have shortcomings. The impression conveyed
by the cases filed in all the district courts within the three circuits
might differ from the impression conveyed by the cases filed in the
three districts studied. Similarly, the portrayal of litigation by
cases appealed from the three districts might differ from that of
litigation embodied in the appeals studied in the three circuits as a
whole. In addition, it may be that both the district courts and cir-
cuit courts studied are not typical of other districts and circuits.
Despite these problems, several factors suggest that the results
presented here are meaningful, if not conclusive. First, the samples
studied are large enough on their own to warrant attention. At the
appellate level the study encompasses more than five years of opin-
ions in one-quarter of the regular courts of appeals. These results
are important even if they are not wholly representative. It is un-
likely that the impression conveyed by such a large group of cases
is wildly unrepresentative of the larger litigation reality. The sam-
ple at the district court level is also large enough to be significant
by itself. However, since the sample covers only one year, there is a
greater risk that it does not accurately represent constitutional tort
litigation or non-civil-rights litigation over time. Still, in its major
conclusions offered about success and burden on the courts, the
one year study is reinforced by an earlier study of constitutional
tort litigation 5 and by other studies of non-civil-rights litigation.se
Second, both samples contain a reasonable amount of geo-
graphical diversity. The district court sample includes three large
districts representing the East coast, the West coast, and the
South. The appellate study includes important eastern, western,
and southern circuits. The district court sample does, however,
overemphasize urban districts at the expense of rural districts.
Third, for purposes of comparing the relative volume of civil
rights litigation on appeal and at the district court level, we rely
not on samples but on the complete set of national data published
by the Administrative Office. Unfortunately, the data do not in-
clude a separate category for constitutional tort litigation and they
have other drawbacks for study of constitutional tort litigation.17
35 Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study,
67 Cornell L Rev 482 (1982).
3' Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 729 n 36 (cited in note 3) (reviewing other
studies).
37 Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 662-68 (cited in note 3) (detailing the
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Still, it is the most complete and widely relied upon set of data
about the federal court system.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION ON APPEAL
This section examines the volume, success, and nature of con-
stitutional tort litigation on appeal. Subsection A looks at appel-
late litigation by itself, comparing constitutional tort cases with
the non-civil-rights cases in our control group. Subsection B then
compares constitutional tort cases on appeal with constitutional
tort cases in district court. Subsection C suggests how district
court constitutional tort litigation appears through the lens of ap-
pellate opinions, and how this perception differs from the reality of
constitutional tort litigation in the district courts.
A. Constitutional Tort Appeals Compared with Non-Civil-Rights
Appeals
Two central concerns about constitutional tort litigation are
its burden on the courts and the perceived impact of successful
suits.3 8 Particular classes of cases can burden the courts in several
ways, including their fraction of the docket, their difficulty, and
their time on the docket. By these measures, how does constitu-
tional tort litigation differ from other litigation? Whether or not
they are more burdensome, do constitutional tort cases fare better
or worse than others? With the appellate level experience revealed,
it is then possible to consider the different observers' pictures of
constitutional tort litigation.
1. Burden as Measured by Fraction of the Appellate Docket
and Published Opinions.
Although the Administrative Office does not separate out con-
stitutional tort cases as a distinct category of appellate litigation, it
provides broader civil rights litigation categories that encompass
constitutional tort litigation and other civil rights cases." Table I
difficulties in relying on the Administrative Office data). See also note 39 (discussing Admin-
istrative Office case categories).
3' Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 644-52 (cited in note 3).
'9 For the relationship between Administrative Office categories and constitutional tort
litigation, see Eisenberg, 77 Georgetown L Rev at - (cited in note 13); Eisenberg & Schwab,
72 Cornell L Rev at 663-65 (cited in note 3); Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 723-
25, 728-29 n 34 (cited in note 3). While these categories overstate the number of constitu-
tional tort cases, they separate out the bulk of employment discrimination cases and pris-
oner habeas corpus filings. Furthermore, the Administrative Office appears to use the same
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presents Administrative Office filing data for the Administrative
Office categories ("other civil rights" and "prisoner civil rights")
that most nearly correspond to our categories of constitutional tort
litigation. We sometimes refer to these Administrative Office cate-
gories as containing "possible constitutional tort" cases. The Table
reports the nationwide total civil filings at the district and appel-
late level for each year, and the percentage of total filings consist-
ing of "other civil rights" cases and "prisoner civil rights" cases.
The appellate numbers and percentages are based on appeals of
civil cases from district courts and do not include direct appellate
review of agency action or appeals of criminal cases.
Table I
Possible Constitutional Tort Cases-Nationwide
Percentage of Appellate & District Court Filings
Year Court Total Other Prisoner % %
Level Civil Civil Civil Other Civil Prisoner
Filings Rights Rights Rights Civ. Rights
1982 appeals 18,784 2,157 2,272 11.5% 12.1%
1982 district 206,193 8,727 17,575 4.2% 8.5%
1983 appeals 20,249 2,334 2,579 11.5% 12.7%
1983 district 241,842 9,938 18,477 4.1% 7.6%
1984 appeals 21,725 2,474 3,090 11.4% 14.2%
1984 district 261,485 10,738 18,856 4.1% 7.2%
1985 appeals 23,571 2,768 3,060 11.7% 13.0%
1985 district 273,670 10,757 19,448 3.9% 7.1%
1986 appeals 24,291 2,889 3,306 11.9% 13.6%
1986 district 254,828 10,366 20,842 4.1% 8.2%
1987 appeals 25,538 2,977 4,166 11.7% 16.3%
1987 district 238,982 10,105 23,697 4.2% 9.9%
Total appeals 134,158 15,599 18,473 11.6% 13.8%
'82-87 district 1,477,000 60,631 118,895 4.1% 8.0%
Source: Administrative Office Annual Reports, Tables B-1A and C-2' °
terminology to describe two slightly different categories. At the district court level, the cate-
gory "other civil rights" does not include cases classified under three additional civil rights
headings, "voting," "accommodations," and "welfare." These categories are listed separately
in the Annual Reports cited in note 40. At the appellate level, the Annual Reports incorpo-
rate these three categories into the larger category "other civil rights," even though the
Administrative Office computer tapes contain the necessary appellate data in each of the
three subcategories. See note 43. The distortion introduced by combining the categories is
not substantial because together the three categories account for a relatively small percent-
age of civil rights activity. See note 43. (showing 75 cases in these three categories and 1,184
cases in what we call the possible constitutional tort categories).
4" Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1982 Annual Report of the Director 194
1989]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Table I shows that "other civil rights" and "prisoner civil
rights" cases constitute a substantial fraction of the appellate
docket. The combined prisoner and nonprisoner ("other civil
rights") possible constitutional tort categories range from about 24
percent to about 28 percent of all appellate review of district court
civil judgments. To obtain an estimate of actual constitutional tort
cases on appeal, one should discount the Administrative Office
figures by the degree to which they include non-constitutional civil
rights claims. Using discount factors developed in our district court
study, this suggests that approximately 21 percent of all civil ap-
peals from federal district courts are constitutional tort cases.4
Table I also suggests that nearly as many appeals are filed in
nonprisoner cases (15,599) as in prisoner cases (18,473). By con-
trast, at the district court level prisoners file almost twice as many
possible constitutional tort complaints as do nonprisoners.
Only appellate judges and other court personnel see the bulk
of filed appeals. Most other observers see only those appeals lead-
ing to published opinions. Because we need not depend on Admin-
istrative Office data to detect published opinions, the published
opinion study enables us to focus more precisely on actual consti-
tutional tort cases as a percentage of all published opinions. We
find, in the three studied circuits, 771 constitutional tort opinions,
with 604 nonprisoner opinions and 167 prisoner opinions. We esti-
mate that the three circuits published a total of 6,287 civil opinions
during this period.42 Thus constitutional tort cases comprised
(Table B-1A); 216 (Table C-2) (GPO, 1982); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1983
Annual Report of the Director 224 (Table B-1A); 246 (Table C-2) (GPO, 1983); Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts, 1984 Annual Report of the Director 232 (Table B-1A); 254
(Table C-2) (GPO, 1984); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1985 Annual Report of
the Director 248 (Table B-1A); 280 (Table C-2) (GPO, 1985); Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, 1986 Annual Report of the Director 142 (Table B-1A); 176 (Table C-2) (GPO,
1986); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1987 Annual Report of the Director 142
(Table B-1A); 177 (Table C-2) (GPO, 1987).
11 Our district court study found that 74 percent of the cases listed by the Administra-
tive Office as "other civil rights" are constitutional tort cases, and 89 percent of the cases
listed as "prisoner civil rights" cases are constitutional tort cases (the other cases having
solely statutory claims). See Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 725 (Table I) (cited
in note 3). If we assume that equal proportions of constitutional and statutory civil rights
cases are appealed, one can discount the appellate categories by these district court discount
factors. Doing so suggests that appellants in 1982-87 filed appeals in (.74 x 15,599) non-
prisoner constitutional tort cases and (.89 x 18,473) prisoner constitutional tort cases. The
27,984 nonprisoner and prisoner constitutional tort appeals are 20.9 percent of all civil ap-
pellate filings from district court judgments.
412 To construct the control group, we used a Westlaw search designed to capture all
published opinions other than those that might be constitutional tort cases. From this list,
we sampled every eighth case in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and every third case in the
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about 12.3 percent of all published opinions in the three circuits,
with over three-quarters (78 percent) of them involving non-
prisoner cases.4" In comparison, other tort litigation comprised
Third Circuit. Criminal and agency appeals were then removed from the initial sample.
With these exclusions the Ninth Circuit sample yielded 257 published opinions. To estimate
the total number of civil opinions filed in the Circuit, we multiplied this by eight, the in-
verse of the one-eighth sampling ratio, yielding 2,056 published opinions for this circuit.
Similar calculations for the other circuits yield 1,920 published opinions for the Eleventh
Circuit and 789 published opinions for the Third Circuit. We add two classes of cases to this
total of 4,765 opinions. The first is the 771 constitutional tort cases. The second is the 751
cases found in the constitutional tort search that turned out not to be decisions about con-
stitutional tort litigation, which we also use as a crude estimate of nonconstitutional tort
civil rights litigation. This leads to an estimate of total civil opinions available on Westlaw
of 6,287. The control group is weighted to reflect the fact that the sample contains different
proportions of the published opinion population for the three circuits.
"I Recently available data on federal appeals allows an estimate of the study's com-
pleteness. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Federal Judicial
Center have prepared computer tapes containing data on all federal appeals. We extracted
from those tapes all civil appeals (thus excluding criminal appeals and agency-related ap-
peals) for the three circuits for the time period covered by this study. The tapes show 8,202
possible civil, nonagency-related published opinions for the three circuits during the period
studied. The Administrative Office civil rights categories that might yield constitutional tort
cases show the following numbers of published opinions:
actual estimated
other civil rights (code 440) 866 (641)
voting (code 441) 40 (25)
jobs (code 442) 622 (116)
accommodations (code 443) 22 (6)
welfare (code 444) 13 (9)
prisoner civil rights (code 550) 318 (283)
total estimated (1,080)
We discount the actual figures by the yield of true constitutional tort cases in each category
from our district court experience, yielding the parenthetical figures shown next to the ac-
tual figures. See Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 725 (Table I) (cited in note 3).
The result is an estimated total of 1,080 constitutional tort published opinions or 13.2 per-
cent of the total published opinions, with nonprisoner constitutional tort cases comprising
9.7 percent of published opinions and prisoner cases comprising 3.45 percent.
The ratios from our Westlaw searches given in the text, 12.3 percent for the combined
constitutional tort category, 9.6 percent for the nonprisoner category, and 2.7 percent for the
prisoner constitutional tort category are reasonably close to the Administrative Office data.
The only substantial difference is in the relatively low number of prisoner cases found in the
Westlaw search. To the extent the Administrative Office label of "published" does not
match what appears on Westlaw, the difference probably does not dramatically distort the
relative number of constitutional tort cases as compared with other civil cases. See also
Posner, Federal Courts at 70-72 (Table 3.5) (cited in note 7) (finding, using slightly differ-
ent categories, that civil rights cases are 14 percent of signed civil opinions).
One might reduce the disparity between the number of opinions found and the number
of cases the Administrative Office lists as published by excluding "unsigned" opinions from
the totals. Of the 8,202 total published opinions shown on the tapes, 910 opinions are desig-
nated "unsigned" and 236 of these are in the civil rights categories of interest here. See also
note 32. A complete description of Administrative Office data appears in Inter-university
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about 13.8 percent of the published opinions of appeals from dis-
trict courts. 44
As Figure 1 summarizes, appellate judges in these three cir-
cuits publish about the same percentage of nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort opinions as they receive from district courts, about 10
percent.45 Thus, the picture from published opinions is similar to
the picture from appellate filings. By contrast, prisoner constitu-
tional tort cases would seem like a much less important category if
one views opinions rather than appellate filings. They comprise
less than 3 percent of all published civil opinions (167 of 6,287),
but over 12 percent of the appellate filings. The hidden prisoner
cases perhaps explain why judges seem to complain relatively more
about prisoner cases.
Figure 1
Constit. Tort Cases: Percent of Docket
District Court Filings, Appellate
Filings, Appellate Opinions
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Consortium for Political and Social Research (Federal Judicial Center, Principal Investiga-
tor), Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970-1987, ICPSR 8429 (Winter 1989).
For calculations in this note involving Administrative Office data we used Fifth Circuit cases
from 10/1/80 to 6/30/82 and Eleventh Circuit cases thereafter.
" This figure is based on our random sample of non-civil-rights published opinions.
45 One must be cautious about this comparison, because the figures are from different
data sets. The percentage of constitutional tort filings on appeal comes from nationwide
Administrative Office data comparing the "other civil rights" category to all civil non-agency
appellate filings, discounted by figures developed in our study of district court litigation. See
note 41. The percentage of nonprisoner constitutional tort published opinions comes from
our own examination of opinions in the three circuits.
[56:501
Perceptions of the Federal Courts
2. Burden as Measured by Difficulty.
Published opinions suggest that constitutional tort appeals are
about as difficult to resolve as other appeals, although the evidence
is somewhat conflicting with respect to prisoner constitutional tort
appeals. One measure of difficulty is how often the appellate court
hears oral argument in a class of cases. In our study, the Third and
Ninth Circuits' 6 heard argument in 86.6 percent of the nonprisoner
constitutional tort cases in which they published opinions and 67.8
percent of the non-civil-rights cases in which they published opin-
ions.47 Prisoner constitutional tort opinions are more similar to
non-civil-rights opinions in the likelihood of oral argument. The
appellate courts heard argument in only 62.6 percent of the pris-
oner constitutional tort cases in which they published opinions.4
A second measure of an area's difficulty is the degree to which
appellate panels decide cases unanimously. Our study reveals no
statistically significant difference between constitutional tort opin-
ions and non-civil-rights opinions in this regard. Dissents appear in
10.3 percent of the nonprisoner constitutional tort opinions, 11.4
percent of the prisoner constitutional tort opinions, and 8.3 per-
cent of the non-civil-rights opinions. Judges do appear to write sig-
nificantly more concurring opinions in nonprisoner constitutional
tort cases than in non-civil-rights cases. They wrote concurrences
in 54 of the 604 nonprisoner constitutional tort opinions (8.9 per-
cent), while writing only 37 concurrences in the sample of 760 non-
civil-rights opinions (4.9 percent). 9 The propensity to write con-
currences does not appear in prisoner constitutional tort cases.
Judges wrote concurrences in only 9 of 167 prisoner cases (5.4 per-
cent) barely and statistically insignificantly higher than the rate of
concurrences in non-civil-rights cases.
A third measure might be the percentage of published opin-
ions that are issued per curiam rather than signed by a judge. Gen-
erally, the more trivial cases are handled with per curiam opinions.
In nonprisoner constitutional tort cases, the three circuits issued
per curiam opinions in 18.2 percent (110 of 604) of the cases and in
4' The Eleventh Circuit does not indicate in its published opinions whether or when it
heard oral argument in a case. Thus, all figures about percentage of cases argued and time
to disposition relate only to the Third and Ninth Circuits.
47 With 306 nonprisoner constitutional tort opinions and 561 non-civil-rights opinions,
this difference in likelihood of oral argument is statistically significant at the .0000 level.
48 With 91 nonprisoner constitutional tort opinions for which data about argument
were available, this modest difference is statistically insignificant.
"' This difference is significant at the .01 level.
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prisoner constitutional tort cases they issued per curiam opinions
in 29.9 percent (50 of 167) of the cases. In contrast, the appellate
courts issued per curiam opinions in 17.5 percent (133 of 760) of
non-civil-rights appeals, nearly identical to the rate of per curiam
opinions in nonprisoner constitutional tort cases but significantly
less than the rate in prisoner cases.
A final measure of difficulty is the amount of time the appel-
late judges take to decide appeals. The median time for publishing
opinions after oral argument is virtually identical for constitutional
tort and non-civil-rights cases. For opinions published after oral
argument, the median time for publishing nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort opinions was 119 days after argument, and the median
prisoner case took 124 days. The median non-civil-rights opinion
was published 112 days after argument. Courts published opinions
more quickly in cases decided without oral argument, but again
there is almost no difference between constitutional tort cases and
other cases. The median time for nonprisoner constitutional tort
opinions decided without oral argument was 73 days after submis-
sion, and for prisoner cases it was 72 days. The median non-civil-
rights opinion was published 75 days after submission without oral
argument.
To summarize the measures of burden and difficulty of consti-
tutional tort litigation on appeal, about one in eight opinions in-
volve constitutional torts. Courts hear oral argument in constitu-
tional tort cases more often than in other cases. Judges are slightly
more likely to dissent in constitutional tort cases, and (for non-
prisoner cases, at least) significantly more likely to write a concur-
ring opinion. Judges take a similar amount of time to issue consti-
tutional tort opinions (both prisoner and nonprisoner) as non-civil-
rights opinions, with a slightly higher fraction of constitutional tort
opinions being issued per curiam. We conclude, based on these
measures, that the burden of constitutional tort litigation on ap-
peal comes from its substantial percentage of the docket, not from
its being inherently more difficult litigation.
3. Success of Constitutional Tort Plaintiffs.
If the overall burden is one central concern about constitu-
tional tort litigation, its perceived success for plaintiffs and impact
on the court system is another.5 0 Are constitutional tort plaintiffs
more or less successful than other litigants on appeal? Before pur-
10 Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 644-52 (cited in note 3).
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suing this question, it is necessary, as at the district court level,51
to discuss difficulties in measuring success.
In some ways, one can pronounce a winner or loser more confi-
dently in appellate litigation resulting in a published opinion than
in district court litigation. Most importantly, settled cases-with
all their ambiguities about who "won"-are absent. Rather, a party
appeals a judgment of the district court and the appellate court, as
part of the published opinion, affirms or does not affirm the judg-
ment. One can correspondingly designate the appellant as a loser
or winner, and the appellee as a winner or loser. Complications
arise when both parties appeal or when the appellate court affirms
in part and reverses or remands in part. To avoid the ambiguity
introduced by such outcomes, for purposes of analyzing success on
appeal we limit the set of published opinion to those cases in
which it is possible to say that either plaintiff or defendant pre-
vailed on appeal.
Knowing only that the plaintiff or defendant prevailed on ap-
peal, however, provides only part of the information necessary to
decide who fares well at the appellate level. It is widely believed
that appellate courts have a substantial tendency to affirm the de-
cisions of lower courts. 2 If this is true, one must account not only
for whether the plaintiff or defendant prevailed on appeal but also
for whether they sought affirmance or reversal of the district
court's decision. Another problem is that limiting the analysis to
published opinions may underestimate the tendency to affirm. Ap-
pellate courts do not publish routine affirmances, but will explain
most reversals of lower court decisions. Thus, the published opin-
ions may not reveal a tendency to affirm, even if one exists.
With these limitations in mind, Figure 2 shows how plaintiffs
and defendants fare in published appeals in three categories of
cases-constitutional tort, prisoner constitutional tort, and control
group. The control group of non-civil-rights cases reveals a ten-
dency to affirm district court judgments. The instances of affirm-
ance are about equal when plaintiffs are appellants or appellees.
Plaintiffs successfully appealed in 35 percent of the published
cases in which they appealed (65 percent affirmance rate), while
defendants successfully appealed in 33 percent of the published
5 See Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 676-77 (cited in note 3); Schwab &
Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 726-28 (cited in note 3).
52 Stanton Wheeler, Bliss Cartwright, Robert A. Kagan & Lawrence M. Friedman, Do
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970,
21 L & Society Rev 403, 406-07 (1987).
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cases in which they appealed (67 percent affirmance rate)."3
Figure 2
Rate of Reversal by Party Appealing
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In nonprisoner constitutional tort cases, the same affirmance
effect appears when plaintiffs appeal. Nonprisoner constitutional
tort plaintiffs prevailed in 38 percent of the published cases in
which they appealed, a figure near the 35 percent reversal rate in
the control group of non-civil-rights plaintiffs. The affirmance ef-
fect disappears almost entirely, however, when nonprisoner consti-
tutional tort plaintiffs win below. Among the published appellate
opinions reviewing judgments for the plaintiffs, defendants succeed
in about half (48 percent) of the cases.54 A similar, though more
dramatic, pattern holds for prisoner constitutional tort appeals.
Among published opinions, plaintiffs overturned judgments in 48
percent of the cases they appealed, while defendants overturned
53 The control group sample used in this calculation has 411 published opinions in
which plaintiffs appealed and 222 in which defendants appealed. The difference in affirm-
ance rates is not statistically significant at the .10 level.
" The 15 percent difference between nonprisoner constitutional tort defendants and
non-civil-rights defendants in obtaining reversals is statistically significant at the .05 level.
Among the reported opinions with clear outcomes, nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs
appealed 395 cases and defendants appealed 89 cases.
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judgments in 69 percent of the cases they appealed. 5 Thus, among
published opinions, constitutional tort plaintiffs are less successful
than defendants, while non-civil-rights plaintiffs are marginally
more successful than non-civil-rights defendants in reversing judg-
ments. The view from published appellate opinions is that consti-
tutional tort plaintiffs are less successful on appeal than other
plaintiffs.
4. Matters Appealed.
There are two different ways of looking at the matters at issue
in constitutional tort appeals. First, constitutional tort litigation
may be broken down into many mutually exclusive subject areas,
including actions against the police, discrimination claims, employ-
ment claims, First Amendment claims, and other areas." A second
way of viewing matters appealed is to look at the legal doctrines at
issue. Each constitutional tort case will involve not only one of the
above subject areas, but will also involve at least one general legal
doctrine, such as jurisdiction, evidence, periods of limitation, and
the like. These doctrinal categories, unlike subject areas peculiar to
constitutional tort litigation, cross boundaries between constitu-
tional tort and other litigation. For example, both kinds of cases
might involve an appeal from a ruling about a statute of limita-
tions. To the extent discernible and comparable, how do the doc-
trinal issues on appeal in constitutional tort litigation differ from
those in other litigation? Table II shows the relative frequency of
appeal for several doctrinal categories, comparing nonprisoner con-
stitutional tort cases with the control group.
5 Our study contains 111 published opinions where the prisoner constitutional tort
plaintiff appealed and only 16 cases where the defendant appealed. The difference in rever-
sal rates is statistically significant only at the .12 level.
' We discuss how constitutional tort litigation breaks down into these subject areas
later. See text accompanying Table III. See also Theodore Eisenberg, Civil Rights Legisla-
tion 86-87 (Michie, 2d ed 1987).
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Table Il
Comparing Matters Appealed in Constitutional
Tort and Other Litigation
Subject of Appeal
In forma pauperis
Abstention
Subject matter jurisd.
Personal jurisd.
Stat. of limitations
Preclusion
Discovery
Exhaustion of remedies
Evidentiary ruling
Compens. damages
Punitive damages
Fees award or size
Ruling on merits
Venue
Nonpris. Const. Tort
% Appealed by
Plain.
<1%
2%*
10%
<1%
7%*
4%*
1%
3%*
2%
1%*
1%
10%*
55%
1%
Def.
0%
2%*
2%
0%
<1%
1%
0%
1%+
1%
1%
1%
5%*
17%*
<1%
Either
<1%
4%
12%
<1%
7%
4%
1%
4%
3%
2%
2%
14%
69%
1%
Control Group
% Appealed by
Plain. Def. Either
<1% 0% <1%
<1% <1% 1%
8% 3% 10%
1% 1% 2%
4% <1% 4%
2% 1% 2%
1% 1% 1%
1% <1% 1%
2% 2% 4%
3% 2% 4%
1% 1% 2%
2% 2% 4%
50% 33% 78%
<1% <1% 1%
N 604 760
* indicates significantly different from control group at at least .05
level (calculated only for plaintiff and defendant columns)
+ indicates significantly different from control group at at least .05
level before Yates Correction
Notes: Plaintiff and Defendant columns do not add up to "Either" col-
umn due to rounding and due to the fact that in some cases
both plaintiff and defendant appeal an issue. Control group is
weighted to reflect different proportions of non-civil-rights cases
being sampled in the three circuits.
The Table suggests that constitutional tort opinions deal more
often with procedural and other technical matters than do non-
civil-rights opinions, but the difference is modest. Some 78 percent
of the control group opinions address lower court rulings on the
merits. Only 69 percent of the constitutional tort opinions deal
with the merits. Fully 14 percent of the constitutional tort opinions
address attorney fees, while only 4 percent of non-civil-rights opin-
ions examine these issues. The greater frequency of attorney-fees-
related appeals is probably attributable to the right of a prevailing
party to recover fees in civil rights cases.5 The differences in the
57 See 42 USC § 1988 (1982).
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rates of abstention and exhaustion-of-remedies appeals indicate
their relatively larger role in civil rights cases. We also find statisti-
cally significant differences (at the .05 level) between constitutional
tort plaintiff appeal rates and other plaintiff appeal rates in two
other categories: statutes of limitations and preclusion.
In summary, constitutional tort litigation on appeal is not that
different from other appellate litigation. Some of the differences
are explainable by the number and nature of cases filed at the dis-
trict court level and not by any phenomenon peculiar to the treat-
ment of constitutional tort litigation on appeal. The two most dis-
tinctive features detected about constitutional tort litigation are its
numeric prominence on the appellate filing docket and the relative
lack of success for plaintiffs on appeal in comparison to defendants
on appeal.
B. Appellate Cases Compared with Filed Cases
The snapshot of constitutional tort litigation in district court
reveals, in important respects, a different picture than does the
snapshot based on published opinions or appellate filings.
1. Number of Cases.
At the district court level for the three studied districts, non-
prisoner constitutional tort cases comprised about 3 percent of the
district courts' civil filing caseload, and prisoner constitutional tort
cases comprised approximately 4 percent of the caseload.", Apply-
ing the knowledge gained about the actual number of constitu-
tional tort filings, we estimate that nationally in 1980-81 non-
prisoner constitutional tort filings comprised 4.3 percent of the
federal civil district court docket and prisoner constitutional tort
filings comprised 8.1 percent.5 This suggests that the raw number
8 Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 725 (cited in note 3).
" Our district court study yields an estimate of the percentage of district court filings
in 1980-81 that are constitutional tort cases in each Administrative Office civil rights cate-
gory. Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 725 (Table I) (cited in note 3). We multiply
these percentages times the number of cases the Administrative Office reports nationally in
each category for that year to estimate a national number of actual constitutional tort cases.
The percentage estimates and the filings, reported in Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, 1981 Annual Report of the Director 366-367 (Table C2) (GPO, 1981), are:
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of constitutional tort filings is smaller than is generally believed."0
The published opinion study shows nonprisoner constitutional
tort litigation comprising about 10 percent of the courts of appeals
workload. This is a rate roughly three times higher than the per-
centage of nonprisoner district court filings in the three studied
districts. Table I above offers further evidence of greater propor-
tionate appellate-level constitutional tort activity. Administrative
Office data reveal dramatic differences in the percentage of filings
consisting of possible constitutional tort cases at the district court
and appellate level. The combined percentage of prisoner/non-
prisoner civil rights filings from 1982 to 1987 is about twice as high
for appeals as it is for district court filings. The reader of published
opinions or the observer of all appellate filings thus might conclude
that constitutional tort litigation is substantially more voluminous
than detailed inspection of district court filings indicates.
An especially large difference exists at the appellate level be-
tween the relative number of prisoner constitutional tort cases re-
vealed by the published opinion study and the relative number of
such cases suggested by Administrative Office filing data. Prisoner
cases comprise only 2.7 percent of published opinions but about 12
percent of filings. This suggests that, despite the low number of
opinions, it would not be surprising if appellate judges found pris-
oner cases to be a substantial part of their docket. Courts of ap-
peals dispose of prisoner cases, more than other cases, on prelimi-
nary procedural grounds and without argument or published
percent filings filings
estimates reported estimated
other civil rights 74.0% 8,433 6,240
voting 62.5% 152 95
jobs 18.7% 6,245 1,168
accommodations 27.3% 336 92
welfare 69.2% 253 175
total nonprisoner 7,770
prisoner civil rights 89.0% 16,473 14,661
The Administrative Office also reports a total of 180,576 civil cases filed in 1980-81. Id.
Multiplying the category figures by the corresponding percentages yields 7,770 estimated
actual constitutional tort cases out of a total of 180,576 filings or 4.3 percent of the federal
docket. In the prisoner civil rights category, the Administrative Office reports 16,473 filings.
Id. If 89 percent of those were actual constitutional tort cases, the 89 percent times 16,473
or 14,661 out of 180,576 or 8.1 percent of the civil docket consisted of prisoner constitutional
tort claims. Earlier higher figures reported in Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 725
n 25 (cited in note 3), are erroneously based on the total cases figure for "actions under
statutes" at the top of page 367 in the Administrative Office Report rather than on the true
total figure at the top of page 366.
'0 Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 724-25 (cited in note 3).
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opinion. For example, in fiscal 1986 what the Administrative Office
labels "terminations on the merits" occurred in 53.9 percent of all
appeals terminated but only in 47.1 percent of private prisoner pe-
titions.6 1 And although 55.0 percent of terminated federal question
cases received appellate oral hearings, only 12.2 percent of prisoner
civil rights petitions were accorded oral hearings.2
2. Success Rates.
At the district level, constitutional tort litigation fares worse
than most other litigation in almost every measurable respect."
Nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs secure judgments as the
result of trials or motions in 5 percent of filed cases and obtain
settlements (generously defined) in 45 percent of filed cases."
Non-civil-rights plaintiffs succeed in court in 11 percent of filings
and obtain settlements in 73 percent of filings.6 5 If one limits the
universe of cases to those disposed of in court, thus eliminating
settlements, the difference between constitutional tort and other
litigation widens. Nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs win
only 9 percent of district court judgments, and prisoner constitu-
tional tort plaintiffs win less than 1 percent of judgments. Non-
civil-rights plaintiffs, by contrast, win 41 percent of district court
judgments.6
No single number exists by which to compare the success rates
of constitutional tort plaintiffs in district court and on appeal. Set-
tlements play no significant numerical role in appellate litigation
but are a major method of district court disposition.7 District
court judgments are probably more concrete indicators of success
than appellate judgments, where a victory may simply send the ap-
pellant back to district court." Further, comparing absolute num-
81 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1986 Annual Report of the Director 155
(Table B-5) (GPO, 1986).
11 Id at 142 (Table B-1A).
63 Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 728-30 (cited in note 3).
84 Id at 733 (Table IV).
65 Id.
" Figures obtained by calculations based on data from id at 733 (Table IV).
67 Id.
68 Successful appeals are those in which the plaintiff obtains reversal of an adverse rul-
ing below. An appellate court reversing an unfavorable ruling below often is not awarding
the constitutional tort plaintiff anything. At the district court level, however, successful
cases are those in which plaintiffs actually recover something. Thus the nature of the appel-
late process might lead to a natural increase in the apparent success rates of groups of
plaintiffs that fare poorly below. Success is in some sense easier to achieve on appeal and
this might explain some of the reduced gap between constitutional tort and control group
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hers is always problematic when they are derived from different
data sets-in this case, our district court study of filed cases and
our appellate study of published opinions. Thus, one must hesitate
before declaring that constitutional tort plaintiffs appear relatively
more successful on appeal than in district court.
Although one must acknowledge the different possible yard-
sticks of success, recall that we are most interested in the perspec-
tives of different observers. Whether or not a successful appeal is
as "real" a victory as is a win at trial, the appellate observers see
mostly what goes on in appellate cases. They of course know that
some reversals and remands won't lead to a recovery on remand,
but their scorecards of wins and losses are maintained in terms of
the possibilities at the appellate level. To them a reversal at the
intermediate stage of proceedings is a victory for plaintiffs because
it at least gives the plaintiff a chance of ultimate recovery.
With these qualifications in mind, by any measure of success
constitutional tort plaintiffs appear more similar to other plaintiffs
(and thus appear more successful) on appeal than in district court.
As Figure 2 shows nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs suc-
ceed in 38 percent of the cases they appeal that lead to opinions.
Non-civil-rights plaintiffs succeed in 35 percent of such cases. De-
fendants in nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation succeed in
their appeals 48 percent of the time. Defendants in non-civil-rights
cases succeed 33 percent of the time. Whether one examines only
district court judgments or includes settled cases, the gap between
nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation and other litigation ap-
pears greater than the relatively modest disparity in published ap-
pellate opinions.
3. Subject Matter.
Although some constitutional claims cannot give rise to consti-
tutional tort actions,"' the vast bulk of constitutional wrongs are
cognizable under § 198370 or Bivens.11 The variety of possible con-
cases. For example, even though plaintiff-appellant success rates are higher for prisoners
than for nonprisoners, see Figure 2 supra, they may be succeeding simply in obtaining rever-
sal of pretrial motions to dismiss their cases. Such appellate victories may not result in
ultimate success for the plaintiff.
9 See Schweiker v Chilicky, 108 S Ct 2460 (1988) (no Bivens action); Bush v Lucas,
462 US 367 (1983) (no Bivens action); Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v Kassel, 730 F2d
1139 (8th Cir 1984) (no § 1983 claim).
70 See, for example, Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167 (1961).
71 See, for example, Carlson v Green, 446 US 14 (1980); Davis v Passman, 442 US 228
(1979); Butz v Economou, 438 US 478 (1978).
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stitutional tort claims suggests peering within the constitutional
tort category. How does the subject matter of constitutional tort
litigation shift when one moves from district court filings to pub-
lished appellate opinions? Table III subdivides constitutional tort
litigation by subject matter and presents success rates within each
category.72
Table III
Success and Number of Appellate & District
Court Constitutional Tort Cases
by Kind of Case
nonprisoner
case type
Police
Employment
Other Disc.
Due Process
Malic. Pros.
Tax
Misc.& Missing
1st Amendment
Judicial Error
Total Nonprisoner 513
Prisoner 626
District Court Filings
Plaintiff's
N % of const. Success
tort cases Rate
100% 50%
Appellate Opinions
N % of const. Success of party appealing
tort cases (cases with clear outcomes)
pltf. appeals def. appeals
% win N % win N
77 13% 40% 53 10% 10
61 10% 32% 41 55% 11
40 7% 57% 23 50% 8
207 34% 36% 135 74% 27
7 1% 50% 4 100% 1
16 3% 8% 13 -% 0
68 11% 28% 50 50% 10
122 20% 49% 71 24% 21
6 1% 40% 5 100% 1
604 100% 38% 395 48% 89
48% 111 69% 16
At the district court level, police misconduct cases accounted
for almost one-third of filed nonprisoner cases. Discrimination
claims (the "Employment" and "Other Discrimination" categories)
accounted for about 20 percent of filed cases. First Amendment
claims were a mere 10 percent of filings. Prisoners filed more con-
stitutional tort cases than did nonprisoners. From the perspective
of published appellate opinions, matters change dramatically. Po-
lice-related claims fall to about 13 percent of published opinion
cases and the percentage of employment discrimination claims
drops considerably as well. In contrast, the proportion of due pro-
cess claims rises substantially and First Amendment claims on ap-
peal appear twice as often as in the district court filings.
The relative success of constitutional tort categories also is re-
72 The subject matter categories in Table III are mutually exclusive. We recognize that
some cases do not comfortably fit into only one category.
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shuffled on appeal. 3 At the district court level, police, First
Amendment and other discrimination claims were the most suc-
cessful areas of constitutional tort litigation, but all the large cate-
gories had similar success rates. In published appellate opinions,
First Amendment claims clearly outpace police and employment
discrimination claims in terms of the plaintiff's success rate as ap-
pellant.7 4 Even more noticeable is the increased success of prisoner
cases, which looked uniformly unsuccessful at the district court
level. Appeals brought by prisoners are one of the most successful
categories of cases, and would be more so if the 10 unsuccessful
parole and probation proceedings were excluded (none was
successful) .5
C. District Courts Viewed Through Published Appellate Opinions
Comparison of constitutional tort litigation on appeal with
constitutional tort litigation at the district court level suggests that
observers of these two branches of the federal court system would
have different impressions of constitutional tort litigation. For
many observers of the litigation system, however, there is an air of
unreality about our district court perspective. Although our prior
work provides detailed data about district court filings and disposi-
tions, most observers lack such information. Their information
about activity at the district court level comes, as it does in most
traditional law school courses, from information conveyed by pub-
lished appellate opinions.
One concerned about how impressions of litigation reality are
formed and vary could pose the following questions: What does
district court constitutional tort litigation look like when viewed
through the lens of published appellate opinions? How does that
picture differ from what one sees about district court level activity
when more complete information is available? The basic question
here differs from that pursued in the previous section. That section
asked how actual characteristics of appellate work (as reflected in
73 The appellate success columns in the table exclude cases with ambiguous outcomes
on appeal and thus have lower totals than the other columns.
71 The need to distinguish between a litigant's status as appellant and appellee compli-
cates assessing overall success at the appellate level. See text at notes 54-55.
71 Excluding the 10 unsuccessful prisoner probation and parole cases would show pris-
oners succeeding in 53 percent of the cases in which they appealed, higher than all non-
prisoner plaintiff appeal success rates in Table III except the plaintiff appeal success rate in
the "other discrimination" cases (a small number of cases). In contrast, prisoners as appel-
lees fare rather poorly, losing 69 percent of the cases in which the defendant appeals (a 31
percent prisoner-appellee success rate).
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published opinions) differ from the actual characteristics of district
court activity (as reflected in district filings). It compared snap-
shots of two different levels of the federal court system. The focus
now is only on the district court level, but using two different pic-
tures of it. One picture is of district court reality as reflected in the
district court filings study; the other is of district court activity as
reflected in appellate opinions. The two pictures of the same sub-
ject differ substantially. The appellate filtering process distorts
both the procedural dispositions and the success rate.
Note that only certain comparisons are available. One cannot
compare how the bulk of filed cases fare at the district court and
appellate levels because only a small fraction of any class of cases
rises to the appellate level. The federal court system has over
200,000 district court civil filings and about 25,000 appeals from
those filings. 6 The bulk of filings do not exist at the appellate level
and no direct information about them can be contained in appel-
late opinions. In particular, the large chunk of litigation that ends
in settlement virtually disappears at the appellate level. Neverthe-
less, several characteristics of district court litigation can be dis-
cerned through the appellate lens. How much distortion does that
lens introduce and is the distortion in a direction that helps ex-
plain the differences in perceptions about constitutional tort
litigation?
1. Success of Tried Cases Viewed from Appeal.
Tried cases provide one area in which success at the district
court level can be viewed from both the appellate and district
court perspectives. In district court cases litigated to trial, earlier
work shows that plaintiffs prevail in 27.4 percent of nonprisoner
constitutional tort cases, 18.5 percent of prisoner constitutional
tort cases, and 56.3 percent in the control group of non-civil-rights
cases.17 Nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs thus do roughly
half as well at trial as non-civil-rights plaintiffs, and prisoners do
one-third as well. In tried district court cases leading to published
appellate opinions, by contrast, constitutional tort plaintiffs pre-
vailed at trial at the district court level in 135 of 251 (54 percent)
cases, a rate more than double that found at the district court
level. In the group of non-civil-rights cases with published opin-
" Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1987 Annual Report of the Director 108-09
(Tables S-6 & S-8) (GPO, 1987).
7 Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 729 n 37 (cited in note 3).
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ions, plaintiffs prevailed in 178 of 194 (61 percent) cases, a rate not
significantly different from that of tried district court successes.
Impressions of the legal system shaped by published opinions thus
would tend to overestimate the trial success rate of constitutional
tort plaintiffs. Indeed, at the appellate level their trial success rate
is not statistically distinguishable from the success rate of other
litigation. At the district court level, constitutional tort plaintiffs
fare much worse. Yet for the control group there is a close match
between the trial success rate found in the district court study and
the rate obtained by observing only published opinions.
2. Procedural Progress.
The published appellate opinion snapshot of district court
proceedings shows cases reaching trial in 33 percent of nonprisoner
constitutional tort cases and 25 percent of prisoner cases, and 39
percent of control group cases. Study of filings at the district court
level shows trials commencing in 15 percent of nonprisoner cases, 5
percent of prisoner constitutional tort cases and 10 percent of con-
trol group cases. To some, the more appropriate district court
comparison might not be the universe of all filed cases but the
group of district court filings resolved in court, thereby excluding
settlements. Limiting study to in-court dispositions, calculations
using results from our prior work show that nonprisoner constitu-
tional tort cases reach trial in 76 of 280 (27 percent) cases, prisoner
constitutional tort cases reach trial in 31 of 520 (6 percent) cases,
and control group cases reach trial in 65 of 176 (37 percent)
cases.
7 9
Analysis of these data uncovers two distortions in the appel-
late lens. First, though the district court filings establish that non-
prisoner constitutional tort cases have trial rates greater than
other litigation, constitutional tort cases appear to have trial rates
lower than other litigation if one looks at the universe of cases re-
solved other than by settlement, or at published appeals. Second,
the observer of published opinions would see prisoner case trial
rates relatively higher than would the observer of either universe
of district court cases.
3. Fiscal Impact.
Table IV shows the fiscal characteristics of cases at the district
71 Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 733 (Table IV) (cited in note 3).
79 These calculations are based on figures at id and exclude settled cases.
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and appellate levels. The district court study showed recovery of a
money judgment in 2 percent of nonprisoner constitutional tort
cases filed and in 10 percent of the control group cases filed."0 Pub-
lished appellate opinions reveal money judgments in 70 of 604
(11.6 percent) nonprisoner constitutional tort cases and in 19.6
percent of control group cases filed. Thus, the intergroup ratio of
money judgments is 5 to 1 at the district court level and less than
2 to 1 at the appellate level, and within the group of nonprisoner
constitutional tort cases, money judgments show up in opinions
more than five times as frequently as they show up in filed cases.
Table IV
Fiscal Characteristics:
Constitutional Tort & Other Litigation,
District Courts & Published Opinions
Frequency of Money Judgments
Nonprisoner Control Groups
Constit. Tort W/O Defaults
N % N %
dist. court filings 13 2% 57 10%
published opinions 70 11.6% 149 19.6%
Size of Money Judgments (Dollars)
w/o defaults
dist. court filings N=13 N= 194 N=57
mean 53,924 32,903 77,095
median 55,750 3,110 17,500
published opinions N=56 N=73
mean 54,308 411,297
median 26,725 67,363
If we exclude settlements from district court filings and ex-
amine only cases resolved in court, the relative frequency of money
judgments for constitutional tort plaintiffs decreases even more.
Nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs obtain money judgments
in 10 of 280 (3.6 percent) cases, prisoner constitutional tort plain-
tiffs obtain money judgments in about 1 percent of 520 cases, and
control group plaintiffs obtain money judgments in 65 of 176 (37
percent) cases.81 Under both measures of district court recovery
0 Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 733 (Table IV) (cited in note 3). We em-
phasize that the money judgment figures merely reflect what appears in court records. They
do not necessarily account for all money transfers in the studied cases.
S" These calculations are based on figures in id. The district court control group figure
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rates, constitutional tort litigation, viewed through published ap-
pellate opinions, looks (1) much more like other litigation and (2)
much more successful than it does when viewed from the perspec-
tive of district court filings.
The size of monetary awards also differs substantially when
viewed from the appellate level. Unfortunately, the low absolute
number of district court monetary recoveries affects the certainty
of our conclusions here. Settlements, more than money judgments,
probably shape the fiscal impression of district court litigation.
Nevertheless, in nonprisoner constitutional tort cases the median
district court award is twice the size of the median district court
award in published opinions, contrary to the usual trend of appel-
late litigation showing greater success and sizes of awards. The re-
lationship between the control group and constitutional tort cate-
gories is also interesting. On appeal we find what one might expect:
the amount awarded in constitutional tort cases is dwarfed by ap-
pellate awards in other classes of cases. But at the district court
level, even excluding the many default judgment cases, the few
constitutional tort cases that achieve money judgments hold up
quite well in size compared to the control group.
IV. THE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
LITIGATION
Today there exist two fundamentally different impressions of
constitutional tort litigation. One is the general impression, de-
scribed by us elsewhere,82 of numerous successful constitutional
tort cases imposing massive monetary costs on state and local gov-
ernments. The other is the impression, supported by our district
court study, of relatively fewer cases meeting with poor success
and having a modest fiscal impact.83 It is instructive to compare
these two real-world impressions of constitutional tort litigation
with the different perspectives of our three hypothetical observers
of the legal system.
in text (65 of 176) differs from the 57 control group money judgments shown in Table IV.
The table uses only the 57 cases in which the amount of a money judgment is known (as
opposed to the fact of its existence). The 65 of 176 figure includes 8 other cases in which we
know there was a money judgment, but we do not know the amount. In Table IV, we evalu-
ate amounts of judgments and therefore are limited to cases with known dollar figures.
82 See Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 644-52 (cited in note 3); Schwab &
Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 720 n 2 (cited in note 3).
83 See Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 658-92 (cited in note 3); Schwab &
Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 723-39 (cited in note 3).
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A. Different Information Explains Different Impressions
Our first observer is the idealized law professor, able to read
and synthesize every published appellate opinion. The professor
sees that nonprisoner constitutional tort cases make up about 10
percent of all cases and that prisoner cases account for roughly an
additional 3 percent. A constitutional tort plaintiff is as successful
in overturning a judgment below as are other plaintiffs. Impres-
sively, even prisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs are reasonably
successful in overturning judgments. The major difference between
constitutional tort and other litigation is that constitutional tort
plaintiffs cannot hold judgments on appeal. Constitutional tort de-
fendants (governments and their officials) overturn half the judg-
ments they appeal in nonprisoner cases, while defendants in other
cases, like most plaintiffs, succeed in overturning only about 35
percent of the judgments against them. District court judgments
favoring prisoners are even more likely to get reversed. While rela-
tively few judgments favoring prisoners are discussed in published
opinions,84 appellate courts reverse them two-thirds of the time.
The professor also finds that nonprisoner constitutional tort plain-
tiffs obtain money judgments in about 12 percent of the reported
cases.15 Constitutional tort cases take about as long to decide, and
nonprisoner cases generate more concurring and dissenting
opinions.
To the professor, prisoner cases do not differ dramatically
from nonprisoner cases, except that there are far fewer of them
and the judgments below are less stable. Prisoners appealing ad-
verse judgments below are somewhat more successful than non-
prisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs (as well as non-civil-rights
plaintiffs). Prisoners seem to have greater difficulty in having
favorable judgments affirmed on appeal, but there are too few
cases for the professor to be confident of this. Prisoner cases take
about as long and spur as many dissents but somewhat fewer
concurrences.
The professor realizes that published appellate opinions give a
window on district court activity. Gazing through this window, the
professor sees that about the same percentage of constitutional
tort cases go to trial and succeed as do other classes of cases. Con-
"' Recall that our brilliant professor reading every published opinion in the Third,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits from 1980-85 could find only 16 cases where a prisoner consti-
tutional tort plaintiff had prevailed below. See note 55. Ten of those judgments were re-
versed on appeal.
85 See Table IV.
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stitutional tort litigation looks like it yields money judgments rea-
sonably frequently though only about half as frequently as other
litigation.
The idealized appellate judge has a different vantage point,
observing all appeals, not just the ones leading to published opin-
ions. Importantly, the appellate judge sees far more prisoner ap-
peals, comprising about 14 percent of the overall appellate civil
docket (not including cases from agencies). Because our study does
not include an examination of the outcome of all filed appeals, we
do not know what the appellate judge thinks about the overall suc-
cess rate or size of awards of all constitutional tort appeals.
Finally, the district judge sees a dramatically different picture.
Most important, is that the bulk of cases are privately settled
rather than decided by the court. Nonprisoner constitutional tort
cases constitute a smaller fraction of litigation, only about 4 per-
cent. Prisoner constitutional tort cases far outnumber nonprisoner
constitutional tort cases. 86 While settlement is the main method of
disposing of non-civil-rights cases (fully 73 percent settling), less
than half (45 percent) of the nonprisoner constitutional tort cases
settle and only 17 percent of prisoner constitutional tort cases set-
tle.8 7 Thus, constitutional tort cases are resolved more frequently
by district court judgments than are other cases. Along with this,
nonprisoner constitutional tort cases comprise much higher than
normal percentages of district court hearings and trials.
In short, the perspectives differ in important respects. The
district court judge sees a lower percentage of constitutional tort
filings, but the cases settle less frequently, take up more court
time, yet win disproportionately fewer judgments. The appellate
judge sees a higher fraction of constitutional tort filings. And the
professor reading appellate opinions sees a substantial number of
constitutional tort cases that are reasonably successful. Together,
the different perspectives suggest that there is no single, correct
description of constitutional tort litigation.8 Our admittedly ideal-
86 Our analysis focuses on constitutional tort litigation and separates out habeas corpus
cases filed by prisoners. A district judge who lumps all prisoner cases together, would find
that prisoners occupy a substantially larger fraction of the civil docket. See the Annual Re-
ports cited in note 40. See also Eisenberg & Schwab, 72 Cornell L Rev at 665, 667 (Tables II
and IV) (cited in note 3).
87 Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 733 (Table IV) (cited in note 3). The set-
tlement estimates from the earlier study should be regarded as upper limits on the settle-
ment rates. In that study we employed a generous definition of successful settlement to
avoid understating the success of constitutional tort litigation. Id at 726-27.
88 The one conclusion common to all viewers is that constitutional tort plaintiffs are
less successful than other plaintiffs.
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ized judges and commentators are not interpreting the same infor-
mation in a radically different manner. They are seeing different
information about the system.
B. Why Might One Impression Dominate?
If there is no single correct view, and if the district court real-
ity is every bit as (if not more) reflective of constitutional tort ac-
tivity as the appellate perspectives, one further question arises.
Despite this variety of possible viewpoints about constitutional
tort litigation, those bothering to write about it share a more uni-
form vision-that of many more cases, and many more successful
cases, than the district court experience suggests. One might ex-
pect more observers to write about how surprisingly few (relative
to common perceptions) constitutional tort cases there are and
how uniformly unsuccessful the cases are. Why is there this asym-
metry in expressed views given the richer mix of possible view-
points reflected in the data about constitutional tort litigation?
Consider the observer of published opinions who also knows or
reads about the great number of prisoner cases filed. This observer,
who has the characteristics of many real world observers, would
read about prisoner litigation in published opinions and observe a
class of modestly successful litigation. The observer's knowledge of
many prisoner filings might lead to unconsciously attributing the
published opinion success rate to the mass of prisoner litigation,
thereby enormously increasing, in the observer's mind, the raw
number of successful prisoner cases. Direct observation of actual
district court activity would quickly dispel this impression.
In the nonprisoner context, the observer would make the same
error. By any account there are many constitutional tort filings.8 9
The observer might apply the success rate in published opinions to
all nonprisoner litigation. The observer might well conclude, with
some confidence, that there are abundant numbers of successful
constitutional tort cases. And although the mean award in such
cases seems low compared to other litigation, it is, when combined
with a success rate inflated by the appellate perspective, high
enough in an absolute sense to raise concern about the fiscal conse-
quences of constitutional tort litigation.
In both the prisoner and nonprisoner contexts, the observer
Our findings that constitutional tort litigation is less frequent than many believe and
our questioning the existence of a recent explosion in constitutional tort litigation, see text
at note 3, do not mean that constitutional tort cases are an insubstantial part of federal
litigation.
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takes information from the most readily available cases, published
opinions, and applies it to the universe of nonobservable cases, dis-
trict court filings."0 The cases for which information is most readily
available thereby dominate and inflate the real world observer's es-
timate of constitutional tort litigation's success throughout the
system.
The skewing towards overstating the impact of constitutional
tort litigation receives important reinforcement from the "big
case" phenomenon at the district court level. For even though it is
at the district court level that constitutional tort litigation seems
numerically least frequent and least successful, the district courts
handle a highly visible class of cases that are not representative of
constitutional tort litigation as a whole.
Many people know little about what goes on in the district
courts other than what they read about large scale institutional
cases involving prisons, hospitals, and school systems. These cases,
though numerically a small fraction of the docket, manage to dom-
inate local headlines, make national news, comprise the subject of
entire law school casebooks, and occupy many commentators. They
are important, complex, long-lasting, and controversial. If one's
major source of information about constitutional tort litigation
consists of newspaper and scholarly accounts of institutional cases,
and one succumbs to the illusion that what one observes is repre-
sentative of what one does not see,9 constitutional tort litigation
again will be perceived as more burdensome and significant than it
actually is.
C. Explaining Appellate-District Court Differences
Three elements of the appellate and district perspectives
stand out. First, both appellate opinion readers and district court
"* Tversky and Kahneman argue that an observer "attempts to construct some in-
stances and judges overall frequency by availability, that is, by an assessment of the ease
with which instances could be brought to mind." Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalneman, Avail-
ability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 166
(Cambridge, 1982). Consequently, they continue, instances that are easily recalled will be
perceived as occurring more frequently than instances that are less readily available. They
term this the availability heuristic. Applying the appellate success rate to the large class of
district court filings also implicates what Twersky and Kahneman refer to as "representa-
tiveness." Think of all cases as a class and appellate litigation as a subset of the class. Our
observer may be giving appellate litigation too much credence as a representative of all
litigation. See, for example, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and By Rep-
resentativeness, in id at 84, 86.
91 See generally Tversky & Kahneman, Part II: Representativeness, in id at 23-98.
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observers see that constitutional tort plaintiffs are significantly less
successful than other federal court plaintiffs. Second, this differ-
ence in success rates is less dramatic at the appellate level than at
the trial level. Finally, constitutional tort cases are a much higher
percentage of appellate opinions than they are of district court
filings.
It is not surprising that published opinions offer a different
perspective on constitutional tort litigation than do district court
filings. Parties do not randomly decide which cases to settle and
which to continue through to district court judgment.92 Nor do
they randomly appeal these judgments. Nor do judges randomly
decide which of these appeals to publish. This filtering process, as
we shall call it, makes appellate opinions a biased sample of dis-
trict court filings. If the filtering process differs between constitu-
tional tort cases and other cases, this could explain why the rela-
tive comparisons between constitutional tort and other litigation
differ on appeal and at the district court level.
1. The Publication Filter.
Consider first the decision by appellate judges to publish opin-
ions, while assuming that the rest of the filtering process is the
same for constitutional tort cases and other cases. Judges them-
selves decide whether to publish an opinion. The general criterion
for publication is that the case be noteworthy rather than routine
or obvious, and thus will contribute to the development of the law.
Certainly, cases where district court judges are found "wrong"
would often fit this criterion. One would expect, then, that most
reversals would be published, as well as non-routine affirmances.
This filtering effect of the criterion for publication would tend to
increase the number of reversals found in published opinions over
the actual number of reversals from all appeals. But this filter,
without more, would be uniform across all classes of litigation and
between plaintiffs and defendants. It does not explain the dispro-
portionate number of published opinions reversing judgments for
constitutional tort plaintiffs. Only if the law is becoming harsher
toward constitutional tort plaintiffs would the publication filtering
effect result in a disproportionately high number of reversals
against successful plaintiffs.
Perhaps the reason constitutional tort plaintiffs are less suc-
cessful appellees than other plaintiffs lies in differing receptivity of
"2 Priest & Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 4 (cited in note 17).
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district and appellate judges towards constitutional tort cases. Ap-
pellate judges may be publishing a high number of opinions revers-
ing lower court judgments for constitutional tort plaintiffs because
they are attempting to change the law. This has a ring of plausibil-
ity in light of the time period covered by the study: appellate deci-
sions rendered from October 1980 to December 1985. The district
court decisions studied are clustered in the first year of this period.
Thus, increasing numbers of Reagan appellate appointees would be
reviewing earlier judgments of district court judges-and common
speculation suggests they would view constitutional tort claims
more critically.93
That appellate judges in the early 1980s were attempting to
change constitutional tort law might also explain the relatively
high fraction of the published opinions devoted to constitutional
tort appeals in general. If an area of law is stable, a case applying
this settled law to particular facts is relatively unlikely to be wor-
thy of publication. By contrast, if the substantive constitutional
law is changing during a period, one might expect more published
opinions.
2. The Government as Defendant on Appeal.
Other parts of the filtering process may also lead to different
perspectives on constitutional tort litigation. In prior work we have
suggested that since the government is always the defendant in
constitutional tort litigation, constitutional tort plaintiffs may be
less successful than plaintiffs in other cases. Two aspects of the
government as defendant, both stemming from the government's
position as a repeat player in litigation, seemed particularly criti-
cal. First, government defendants may have higher stakes in litiga-
tion, relative to plaintiffs, than do other defendants. If so, constitu-
tional tort defendants will settle more cases, especially strong cases
93 Rigorous support for this explanation must await more detailed inquiry into the
background of judges, an exploration we have begun in Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, The Influence of Judges and Their Backgrounds in Civil Rights and Prisoner
Cases (unpublished manuscript, February 1989). See generally Stuart Taylor, Jr., The One-
Pronged Test for Federal Judges: Reagan Puts Ideology First in Filling Vacancies, NY
Times E5 (April 22, 1984); Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's
Appointments to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 87 Colum L Rev 766 (1987); C. K. Rowland,
Robert A. Carp & Donald Songer, The Effect of Presidential Appointment, Group Identifi-
cation and Fact-Law Ambiguity on Lower Federal Judges' Policy Judgments: The Case of
the Reagan and Carter Appointees, paper presented at the American Political Science As-
sociation Meeting, New Orleans, Aug 29 - Sept 1, 1985.
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for the plaintiff, rather than risk trial.94 Second, plaintiffs may
have greater difficulty in predicting case outcomes when suing the
government, while government litigators obtain expertise through
experience. The differential ability to assess the strength of the
case may lead to fewer settlements and to plaintiffs bringing
weaker cases to trial. 5
The impact on success rates of differing stakes is intensified
on appeal, where the case may become a general precedent. The
State of Pennsylvania, for example, must worry about the prece-
dential effect throughout Pennsylvania if it loses an appeal from
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case involving state po-
lice. In many cases (but certainly not all), the constitutional tort
plaintiff has less concern with circuit-wide precedent. Because of
their concern with precedent, governments will be more cautious
than plaintiffs in appealing judgments that are likely to be upheld.
They will have a greater tendency to appeal only clear errors or
other cases that are likely to be overturned. For plaintiffs, the pos-
sibility that the judgment will be affirmed is less likely to alter the
decision to appeal because it affects fewer dollars. Thus, constitu-
tional tort defendants are more likely to obtain reversals on appeal
than are constitutional tort plaintiffs.
The impact on success rates of differential accuracy in assess-
ing claims, by contrast, is likely to be reduced on appeal. William
Baxter suggests that as more information about each party's posi-
tion is disclosed, the plaintiff's and defendant's estimates of the
likelihood of success should grow closer.9 6 With both their own as-
sessments and the district judge's rulings as guidance, the parties
should have comparable expectations as to the outcome. Addition-
ally, the issues on appeal often differ from the issues at trial in
ways leading to more similar assessments by the parties. For exam-
ple, at trial a common issue is whether the jury will respond favor-
ably to some evidence. Once the jury has decided, however, the
issue on appeal is whether a rational jury could rule as this jury
did. Usually this question is easier for lawyers to assess. The com-
parable predictions by both parties should lead to settlement in
most cases. Only the most uncertain cases will be appealed. This
factor would thus tend to push all appellate success rates towards
50 percent and explain why constitutional tort appellate success
94 Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 752-55 (cited in note 3).
' Schwab & Eisenberg, 73 Cornell L Rev at 750-52 (cited in note 3).
, William Baxter, The Political Economy of Antitrust, in Robert D. Tollison, ed, The
Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Paper by William Baxter 3, 15 (Lexington, 1980).
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rates are closer to those of the control group than are constitu-
tional tort district court success rates.
Even though higher than district court success rates, constitu-
tional tort appellate success rates may not rise to the level of other
cases because the increased information effect may not apply
equally to all cases. The parties' mutual assessment of case out-
comes may be cloudier, even after trial, in constitutional tort cases
than in other cases. Those who think First Amendment and Due
Process cases are particularly difficult to resolve find support for
this view in these cases' greater share of the appellate docket.9"
Greater difficulty in assessing case law in constitutional tort cases
may also explain why appellate judges see a higher proportion of
constitutional tort cases than do district judges. Litigation models
suggest that areas of greater doctrinal difficulty lead to higher liti-
gation and appeal rates."
3. The Constitutional Tort Plaintiff on Appeal.
Constitutional tort plaintiffs may have different litigation
goals and settlement strategies than other plaintiffs. This differ-
ence might mean that plaintiffs will appeal adverse verdicts with
less regard for the expected payoff on appeal. Obviously, this strat-
egy could lead both to lower success rates than in other appealed
cases and to constitutional tort cases being a higher fraction of the
appellate docket.
One way to test this hypothesis is to examine the stakes of
constitutional tort cases, relative to other cases, at the district
court level and on appeal. All theories of which we are aware, as
well as common sense, suggest that the cases pursued most vigor-
ously by the parties (through trial and appeal) will be cases with
relatively higher stakes than cases that are resolved at more pre-
liminary procedural stages.99 This is because pursuing cases
through the system increases the parties' costs and the increased
costs can be expected to be recovered only in higher stakes cases.
One also expects judges to feel more pressure to publish opinions
in cases involving higher stakes than in less monetarily important
cases. Thus, published opinions probably do not understate the av-
" See Table III for the fraction of constitutional tort cases by subcategory.
98 For example, Professors Priest and Klein project greater litigation rates in areas of
greater uncertainty. Priest & Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 4 (cited in note 17).
" John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J Legal Stud 279 (1973); Rich-
ard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1986); Priest & Klein, 13 J
Leg Stud 1 (cited in note 17).
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erage recovery in appealed cases.
The control groups bear out the theoretical prediction of
higher monetary stakes in cases that the parties are willing to press
to appeal. As Table IV shows, the mean and median recovery as
viewed through published opinions far exceeds the mean and me-
dian recovery as viewed through district court money judgment
cases. In nonprisoner constitutional tort cases, however, the pre-
dicted relationship between appellate level and district court
money judgments is reversed.100 The table shows the median award
as reflected in published opinions is only about one-half the me-
dian award in district court money judgment cases. What could ex-
plain this surprising result? Perhaps it is evidence that constitu-
tional tort plaintiffs are less motivated by a cost-benefit calculus
than are other litigants in deciding whether to appeal.101
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that observers differ in their perceptions of constitu-
tional tort litigation. Some perceive massive amounts of litigation
burdening governments. Others perceive much frivolous litigation.
Still others see smaller numbers of modestly successful cases. A
cynical explanation of the exaggerated perceptions is that some
have an agenda other than describing reality. The more cata-
strophic constitutional tort litigation can be made to appear, the
better the chance of curtailing it. But the perception of volumi-
nous, effective constitutional tort litigation is too widespread for a
wholly skeptical explanation. This article has suggested that the
cases observed affect the perception of constitutional tort litiga-
tion. Readers of published appellate opinions perceive a high per-
centage of successful constitutional tort cases. Those tracking the
outcome of district court cases see a far different reality. It is com-
forting that our data suggest that people acting in utmost good
faith can have such differing views of the system.
100 Prisoner opinions revealed money recoveries in only eleven cases (ten of which were
reversed on appeal), too few to allow meaningful comparisons with other types of cases.
101 Aside from the possible freakishness of the small sample, another possibility is that
the parties assess the cases in which constitutional tort plaintiffs obtain large money judg-
ments in the district court to be very strong. All litigation exhibits a positive relationship
between the size of the award and the objective strength of the case: a jury simply does not
award a major monetary victory unless the case is also very strong on the merits. Perhaps
this correlation is stronger in constitutional tort litigation. If the defendant believes this, it
will not press an appeal. The remaining cases on appeal, then, will have lower stakes than
the district court cases.
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